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I. THE PROBLEM
Since November 1, 1971, securities investors have been sub-
ject to Regulation X1 which was issued by the Federal Reserve
Board pursuant to Title III of the Bank Records and Foreign
Transactions Act.2 Regulation X requires investors to conform
to federal margin regulations which limit the amount of credit
an investor may receive in a securities transaction. Formerly
the margin regulations had been construed to place the "onus of
compliance" only on lenders.3 Thus, absent misrepresentation 4
or conspiracy,5 the lender bore the risk of any loss arising from a
transaction in violation of the margin requirements, even when
1. 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1972). Section 224.2 (a) provides:
(a) Credit obtained from within the United States.-A
borrower shall not obtain any purpose credit from within the
United States unless he does so in compliance with the follow-
ing conditions:
(1) Credit obtained from a G-lender shall conform to
the provisions of Part 207 (Regulation G), which is hereby
incorporated in this part (Regulation X). When the term
"G-lender" is used in this part (Regulation X), it means a per-
son who is not a broker/dealer or bank, who in the ordinary
course of business extends, maintains, or arranges credit that is
secured, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by col-
lateral that includes any margin securities and who is subject
to the registration requirement of section 207.1 (a) of Part 207
(Regulation G).
(2) Credit obtained from a broker/dealer shall conform to
the provisions of Part 220 (Regulation T), which is hereby
incorporated in this part (Regulation X). When the term
"broker/dealer" is used in this part (Regulation X), it means
a person who is a broker or dealer, including every member of
a national securities exchange and includes a foreign branch or
subsidiary of a broker/dealer.
(3) Credit obtained from a bank shall be subject to the
provisions of Part 221 (Regulation U), except for section 221.2
(i). Except for such section, Part 221 (Regulation U) is here-
by incorporated in this part (Regulation X). When the term
"bank" is used in this part (Regulation X), it means a bank
that is subject to Part 221 (Regulation U).
2. Public Law 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970; 15 U.S.C. § 78 (g) (f).
3. See, e.g., Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396
U.S. 904 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y.
1968).
REGULATION X
the investor was aware that he was receiving illegal credit.0
The question that arises after the promulgation of Regulation X
is whether knowledgeable investors, that is, investors aware of
their participation in margin violations 7 should continue to be
protected from loss as they had been under prior case law. This
issue will be examined through an analysis of (1) the margin
rules, their purpose, and the manner of their violation, (2) the
legal basis of investor relief prior to Regulation X, and (3) the
legislative history of the statute implemented by the Regulation.
II. MARGIN CONTROLS
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which first established
margin controls, was enacted as a reaction to the stock market
crash of 1929.8 Encouragement of speculation through the ex-
cessive use of credit in securities transactions was thought to
have been a factor in the market crash and resulting economic
depression." Thus, "for the purpose of preventing the excessive
use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities," Section 7
of the Exchange Act authorized the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to "prescribe rules and regulations with
respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended
and subsequently maintained on any security."' 0 Pursuant to
this authority, the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated the
margin rules regulating extension of credit by broker-dealers
(Regulation T) ,1 banks (Regulation U), and other lenders (Reg-
6. If a loss occurred through a change in market price which
would not have occurred if there had been compliance with the margin
rules the investor could shift the loss to his creditor through a private
suit for damages. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d
1136 (2d Cir. 1970), where the lender failed to liquidate the purchase at
the required time and the market had subsequently decreased by the
time of liquidation so that the plaintiff suffered a loss from the mar-
gin violation. Furthermore, if any loss was borne by the creditor, the
investor could interpose the margin violation as a defense to a subse-
quent claim by the creditor. See, e.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
7. An innocent mistake in violation of the margin rules is not a
violation of Regulation X. 12 C.F.R. § 224.6 (a) (1972).
8. See Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil
Liability, 66 COLvM. L. REv. 1462, 1463 (1966).
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1971).
11. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1972), implements Section 7 of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1971), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities
exchange or any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly to ex-
tend or maintain credit or arrange for the extension or main-
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ulation G).12
Margin rules restrict the use of credit in securities transac-
tions by establishing the maximum "loan value" for a securities
purchase. The "margin" represents the capital which must be
furnished by the investor in a purchase or short sale.13 For ex-
ample, in a purchase through a general account 14 in which he has
no other securities, the investor may borrow only the loan value
of the purchased securities. The investor has five full business
days after the purchase to deposit the "margin" or the remain-
der of the purchase price. 15 If the customer has additional se-
curities in his account the margin due is reduced by the loan
value of those securities.16
Violations of margin regulations occur in two contexts.
First, a securities transaction may be illegal at its inception and
involve the participation of both the lender and the investor.
For example, a loan by a bank to an investor for the purchase of
securities is an immediate violation of Regulation U if the
tenance of credit to or for any customer
(1) on any security (other than an exempted security),
in contravention of the rules and regulations which the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall
prescribe under sections (a) and (b) of this section ....
12. Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1972), and Regulation G, 12
C.F.R. § 207 (1972), were authorized by Section 7 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1971), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person not subject to subsection(c) of this section to extend or maintain credit or to arrange
for the extension or maintenance of credit for the purpose of
purchasing or carrying any security, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board shall prescribe....
13. The loan value is currently 45% of the market value of regu-
lated securities. Thus the margin required is 55%. 12 C.F.R. § 207.5
(1972); 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1972); 12 C.F.R. § 221.4 (1972).
14. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(a) (1972) for a description of a general
account.
15. 2 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1972) provides that:
A creditor shall not effect for or with any customer in a gen-
eral account ... any transaction which ... creates an excess of
the adjusted debit balance of such account over the maxi-
mum loan value of the securities in such account . . . unless
in connection therewith the creditor obtains, as promptly as
possible and in any event before the expiration of 5 full busi-
ness days following the date of such transaction, the deposit
into such account of cash or securities in such amount that the
cash deposited plus the loan value of the securities deposited
equals or exceeds the excess so created ....
16. Id. For example, if the investor wishes to purchase stock for
$10,000, he must provide the $5,500 margin since the stock would have
a loan value of $4,500 as collateral. See note 13 supra. If he already
has other stock worth $10,000 in his account he can receive credit for
the loan value of $4,500 so that he need provide only $1,000 in cash.
[Vol. 57:208
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amount of the loan exceeds the "loan value" of the securities."'
Second, a securities purchase initially lawful may subsequently
become illegal. For example, Regulation T allows a grace pe-
riod following the initial purchase during which the investor
must deposit with the broker the margin in the case of a general
account, or the total purchase price in the case of a cash ac-
count.' s If the investor fails to do so, the transaction must be
liquidated by the broker.19 If the broker does not sell the se-
curities or otherwise liquidate2" the transaction at the end of
17. E.g., Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1015 (D.
Mass. 1949).
18. Regarding general accounts see note 15 supra. For special
cash accounts, 12 C.F.R. 220.4(c) (1972) provides:
(c) (1) In a special cash account, a creditor may effect for or
with any customer bona fide cash transactions in securities in
which the creditor may:
(i) Purchase any security for, or sell any security to, any
customer, provided funds sufficient for the purpose are
already held in the account or the purchase or sale as in re-
liance upon an agreement accepted by the creditor in good
faith that the customer will promptly make full cash pay-
ment for the security and that the customer does not con-
template selling the security prior to making such payment.
(ii) Sell any security for, or purchase any security from,
any customer, provided the security is held in the account
or the creditor is informed that the customer or his princi-
pal owns the security and the purchase or sale is in reli-
ance upon an agreement accepted by the creditor in good
faith that the security is to be promptly deposited in the
account.
19. For a general account, 12 C.F.R. § 220.3 (e) (1972) provides:
In any case in which the deposit required by paragraph (b)
of this section, or any portion thereof, is not obtained by the
creditor within the 5-day period specified therein, margin
nonexempted securities shall be sold . . . prior to the e-xpira-
tion of such 5-day period, in such amount that the resulting
decrease in the adjusted debit balance of such account ex-
ceeds, by an amount at least as great as such required deposit
or the undeposited portion thereof, the "retention requirement'
of any margin or exempted securities sold. ...
For special cash accounts, 12 C.F.B. § 220.4 (c) (1972) states:(2) In case a customer purchases a security (other than
an exempted security) in the special cash account and does
not make full cash payment for the security within 7 days after
the date on which the security is so purchased, the creditor
shall, except as provided in subparagraphs (3) through (7) of
this paragraph, promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate the
transaction or the unsettled portion thereof.
For an example of liquidation other than by sale, see Avery v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1971), where a
short sale was liquidated by the purchase of the stock "sold short" by
the investor, thus the sale was consummated and the loss to the
broker (the difference between the purchase price and sale price) was
deducted from the investor's account.
20. E.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir.
1970).
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the grace period, he has unilaterally extended credit in violation
of the margin rules.2 '
Violations of Reserve Board regulations theoretically are
subject to sanction by the SEC through injunctions,2 2 writs of
mandamus, 23 and revocation of broker-dealer registrations.2 "
The SEC may also transmit evidence of such violations to the
Attorney General for possible criminal prosecution. 25 Compli-
ance with margin regulations is also encouraged by the rules of
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 20 and the
stock exchanges2 7 and by private causes of action by investors
against creditors who violate the margin rules.
III. PROTECTION OF KNOWLEDGEABLE INVESTORS
PRIOR TO REGULATION X
Violation of margin requirements often involves culpability
on the part of both creditor and investor. Both parties may be
aware that the transaction violates margin requirements and
yet knowingly proceed with their bargain. Nevertheless, prior
to Regulation X courts recognized private causes of action by
investors against creditors to recover losses resulting from mar-
gin violations, and in addition, permitted the investor to raise
the violation as a defense to lender claims. Courts thus recog-
nized three theories as bases for protecting investors against
lenders in instances of margin violations. First, under a tradi-
tional tort approach, the investor was considered to be within
the special class of persons the margin rules were designed to
protect. He was thus given a cause of action against his creditor
which was not defeated by the fact that he had consciously par-
ticipated in the violation. Second, Section 29(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was construed to mean that the contracts
21. However, 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 C (6) (1972) provides with re-
spect to a special cash account that an appropriate committee of a na-
tional securities exchange or a national securities association may ex-
tend this time period in exceptional circumstances.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1971).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (1971).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (1971).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1971).
26. See, e.g., In the Matter of Pabombi Securities Co., Inc., Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 6961 (1962), where violations of margin
rules resulted in expulsion of a dealer from the association and revoca-
tion of his registration.
27. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1971),
which provides that before a securities exchange may be registered it
must provide rules for disciplining members who wilfully violate the
Exchange Act or regulations.
[Vol. 57:208
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for purchase or sale of securities made in violation of its regula-
tions were voidable at the investor's option. The investor was
therefore permitted either to sue the creditor on the contract or
set up the creditor's violation as a defense to the creditor's claim.
Third, public policy was considered to require recognition of
private causes of action as a supplement to official enforcement
of the margin regulations. In addition the equitable doctrine of
in pari delicto, which denies relief to a plaintiff at equal fault
with the defendant, was generally not accepted. 28
Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp.2 is the leading case ex-
pounding traditional tort law as a basis of recovery by knowl-
edgeable investors. In Remar the plaintiff sued a broker who
had arranged a bank loan in violation of Regulation U. Finding
that at least a subsidiary purpose of the margin regulations was
to protect investors, the court stated the plaintiff's participation
in the violation was immaterial since Congress regards investors
as incapable of protecting themselves. Citing the Restatement
of Torts, the court held that where a statute is designed to pro-
tect a special class of persons, plaintiffs within such a class have
a cause of action in tort for violation of the statute. While other
cases have apparently agreed that the sophistication of an in-
vestor is not a bar to recovery where the investor consciously
violates margin rules,30 the rationale of Remar has been criticized
on the grounds that such special protection was not intended in
the authorization of margin controls in the Exchange Act 3l and
that the tort rule applies only to exceptional statutes.3 2
A second basis for investor protection has been found in
Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act which provides:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chap-
ter or of any rule or regulation thereunder ... and every
contract . . . the performance of which involves the violation
of... any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person
28. See, e.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74
(S-D.N.Y. 1968), affd 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S.
904 (1969).
29. 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
30. See Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74(S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 904(1969). However, the court considered the investor's sophistication in
light of his misrepresentation which induced the lender violation and
held such wrongful conduct a bar to the investor's request for damages.
31. Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil Lia-
bility, 66 CoLu. L. RPv. 1462 (1966).
32. Id. See also Moscarelli v. Stanm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D.
N.Y. 1968).
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who in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall
have made or engaged in the performance of any such con-
tract. . . .33
Rather than rendering a contract which violates margin require-
ments void as to both parties, Section 29(b) has been construed
to mean that such a contract is void as to the lender but only
voidable as to the investor. Thus, at his option, the investor has
been allowed to sue on the contract for damages, 34 to seek rescis-
sion and restitution, 35 to enforce the contract,30 or to void the
contract as a defense to a lender's suit.
37
In Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,3s recovery by an in-
vestor who was aware that the transaction violated margin re-
quirements was allowed on a third theory that private causes
of action supplement official enforcement of margin regula-
tions. 39 As already noted, however, numerous official sanctions
exist against lenders who violate margin regulations. 40  More-
over, as Judge Friendly argued in dissent, allowing knowledge-
able investors to bring private actions may encourage margin
compliance by lenders while encouraging margin violations by
investors. 4 1 Nevertheless, the court stated that
[t]he danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous in-
vestor is outweighed by the salutory policing effect which the
threat of private suits for compensatory damages can have upon
brokers and dealers above and beyond the threats of govern-
mental action by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
42
In addition to recognizing private causes of action, courts
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1971).
34. See Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
35. See Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.
Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
36. See Myer v. Shields & Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 126, 267 N.Y.S.2d
872 (1966).
37. See Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959)
(lender's counterclaim denied).
38. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
39. A similar theory was earlier advanced by the Supreme Court
in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), where the court
permitted private stockholder suits with respect to proxy violations
upon the theory that private enforcement of proxy rules supplemented
SEC enforcements.
40. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
41. However, consider Judge Friendly's dissenting argument:
Any deterrent effect of threatened liability on the broker may
well be more than offset by the inducement to violations in-
herent in the prospect of a free ride for the customer who,
under the majority's view, is placed in the enviable position of
"heads-I-win-tails-you-lose."
429 F.2d at 1148.
42. 429 F.2d at 1141.
[Vol. 57:208
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have protected knowledgeable investors by denying creditors
the common law defense of in pari delicto. Conceptually, a
knowledgeable investor is at equal fault with the creditor in a
margin rule violation and recovery should thus be precluded by
the defense.43 However, the court in Pearlstein indicated that
an investor who simply has knowledge of the violation is not
subject to the defense since "Congress has placed responsibility
for observing margins on the broker. '44
The case of Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith45 recently reiterated this holding in denying a lender the
defense of in pari delicto, observing that
[i]t was the clear intent of Congress to regulate excessive spec-
ulation on credit and that the means the Congress chose were
the margin requirements which clearly place the onus of meet-
ing certain minimum margin percentages on the brokers and
dealers and not on their customers.46
In refusing to allow the defense of equal fault, the Avery court
also recognized the "private enforcement" rationale of Pearl-
stein,47 but placed primary emphasis upon the clear intent of
Congress to impose the burden of compliance with margin re-
quirements upon the lender and reluctantly allowed recovery by
the knowledgeable investor.
Regulation X provides a potential basis for abrogating each
of these rationales which presently protect knowledgeable in-
vestors. Literally the Regulation merely requires investor com-
pliance with margin requirements and does not provide a resolu-
tion of investor-lender conflicts arising from mutual margin vio-
lations. However, since Regulation X specifically covers invest-
ors it clearly rejects the view that Congress has placed the bur-
den of compliance with margin regulations solely upon lenders.
The impact of Regulation X upon other bases for investor pro-
tection should not be determined without an analysis of the
legislative history of the Act enabling Regulation X.
IV. REGULATION X AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLE III OF THE BANK RECORDS
AND FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS ACT
Title III of the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act
43. See text accompanying note 73 infra, for qualified view.
44., 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970).
45. 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
46. Id. at 680.
47. "The Court concludes that civil liability is a helpful and bene-
ficial adjunct to criminal and administrative sanctions in implementing
the purpose of the Act. . . ." 328 F. Supp. 677, 681 (D.D.C. 1971).
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of 1970 amended section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to prohibit the receipt of loans by investors in violation of margin
regulations.48  Regulation X expressly implements Title 1114
and is designed to regulate credit in the securities markets in
order to ensure compliance with margin regulations."0 The Reg-
ulation thus provides that an investor may not obtain credit
unless the loan conforms with the requirements of Regulation T,
Regulation U, or Regulation G, depending upon the type of lender
involved in the transaction.5 1 A good faith innocent mistake on
the part of a borrower does not violate Regulation X, provided
that the borrower remedies the mistake promptly after discov-
ery.53
Regulation X was promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board, which has general authority to prescribe rules and regu-
lations governing credit in securities transactions."5 Although
promulgated by the Board, Regulation X should nevertheless
be construed in accordance with the purposes of Title III.P4
Thus, a proper interpretation of Regulation X and its effect on
prior case law necessarily entails an examination of the legisla-
tive history of Title III.
Title III was recommended by the House Committee on
Banking and Commerce as an amendment to the Bank Records
48. It is unlawful for any United States person . . . to obtain,
receive, or enjoy the beneficial use of a loan or other extension
of credit from any lender ... for the purpose of (A) purchasing
or carrying United States securities . . . if, under this section
of rules and regulations prescribed thereunder, the loan or
other credit transaction is prohibited or would be prohibited if
it had been made ... in a State.
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1) (1971).
49. 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1972).
50. The stated purpose of Regulation X is
to prevent the infusion of unregulated credit obtained both out-
side and within the United States into U.S. securities markets in
circumvention of the provisions of the Board's margin regula-
tions or by borrowers falsely certifying the purposes of a
loan or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading the pro-
visions of those regulations.
12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1972).
51. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2 (1972).
52. 12 C.F.R. § 224.6 (1972).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1971).
54. For example, the Board may exempt classes of persons, but
only if such exemptions are consistent with the purposes of Title III.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may,
in its discretion and with due regard for the purposes of this
section, by rules or regulation exempt any class . . . from the
application of this subsection [the Title III Amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act].
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (3) (1971).
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and Foreign Transactions Act. As originally introduced, the Act
was designed solely to correct problems of tax evasion and crim-
inal actiivities which were being facilitated by the use of secret
foreign bank accounts55 and contained no reference to margin
regulations. The House Committee was not initially concerned
with problems specifically related to the securities market.50
However, testimony before the Committee later indicated that
unregulated foreign credit contributed to market instability,
and aided corporate takeovers, market manipulation and insider
abuse.5 7 In addition, it was indicated that margin regulations
were being frustrated by foreign lenders and domestic lenders
operating through foreign bank accounts which were not subject
to domestic margin controls.58 In response to the problems cre-
55. The House Report summarized the abuses disclosed during
the committee hearings:
Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial insti-
tutions have permitted proliferations of "white collar" crime;
have served as the financial underpinning of organized crim-
inal operations in the United States; have been utilized by
Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets illegally and
purchase gold; have allowed Americans and others to avoid
the law and regulations governing securities and exchanges;
have served as essential ingredients in frauds including schemes
to defraud the United States; have served as the ultimate de-
pository of black market proceeds from Vietnam; have served
as a source of questionable financing for conglomerate and
other corporate stock acquisitions, mergers and takeovers; have
covered conspiracies to steal from U.S. defense and foreign aid
funds; and have served as the cleansing agent for "hot" or ie-
gally obtained monies.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1970).
56. The author, Rep. Patman, indicated that initial committee
concern was with the "problems posed by the use of secret foreign
bank accounts for illegal purposes. It was our first inclination to draft
a simple piece of legislation that would have outlawed the use of secret
accounts unless there was complete disclosure." 91 CoNG. REc. 16951
(1970).
57. Irving L Pollack, Director, Division of Trading and Markets,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearings on H.R. 15023 Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
176-77 (1970).
58. First, under existing margin rules as interpreted by the
federal court in the MGM litigation, foreign lenders can make
loans to Americans for the purchase of securities in American
markets on any terms they care to. Obviously, to the extent
that margin rules attempt to prevent unwise market credit
extension and "pyramiding," the extension of credit by foreign
lenders without regard to the margin restrictions defeats these
objectives.
Second, we have the problem of policing the margin rules
against the activity of domestic lenders, who disguise their
participation in transactions by effecting them through foreign
intermediaries.
Id. at 179.
1972]
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ated by foreign credit the House Committee recommended Title
III to curb evasion of margin regulations. With respect to Title
III, however, the House Committee Report primarily empha-
sized the role of foreign bank accounts in tax evasion, criminal
activities, and corporate takeovers. 59 Although the Report indi-
cated that requiring domestic investors to comply with margin
requirements would ameliorate margin violations, these viola-
tions had been examined only within the context of secret for-
eign bank accounts and foreign credit.0 0 Thus it appears that
regulation of domestic credit was merely incidental to the pri-
mary legislative purposes of Title III as indicated in the House
Committee Report.61
Like the House Committee, the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Commerce Report on Title III stressed the effect of se-
cret, unregulated foreign credit on market stability and criminal
activities.6 2 Although the Senate Committee which considered
the bill acknowledged that both domestic credit and foreign
credit were regulated by Title III, the Committee hearings indi-
59. Representative Wright Patman commented in a House debate
on Title III:
This amendment [Title III] was found necessary if we were to
wholly and completely deal with the problems created by the
use of secret foreign financial institutions for illegal purposes.
Through a simple device of making the margin re-
quirements applicable to the borrower as well as to the
lender, we will be equipping the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission . . . with sufficient legal and investigative weapons to
require adequate disclosure of foreign financing.
91 CONG. REC. 16954 (1970) (emphasis added).
It is not clear how disclosure of foreign financing would be re-
quired under Title III. However, such view coincides with the initial
purposes of the Foreign Bank Act. See note 54 supra, which indicates
original desire to force disclosure.
60. For example, the House Report noted that:
Americans and others, using the facade of secret foreign banks,
can purchase securities in our market ignoring the Federal Re-
serve Board's regulations on margin requirements and for the
purpose of evading income taxes. American companies are
subject to takeovers or the acquisition of substantial interests
by those about whom little or nothing is known. Criminal ele-
ments infiltrate and control substantial segments of American
businesses through securities purchases and financing by se-
cret foreign sources. Several of the recent corporate takeovers
and acquisitions have involved security considerations in that
defense contractors or other sensitive American industries be-
came the target.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970).
61. The failure of the committee to consider the domestic effects
of the proposed bill was criticized by one of the committee members,
Rep. William Widnall. 91 CoNG. REc. 16957 (1970).
62. S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
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cated that domestic regulation was justified as a measure to pre-
vent margin violations occasioned by investor deception.0 3 Yet,
investor deception already was a recognized exception to court
protection of investors in margin disputes, 4 thus the committee
acceptance of domestic control does not bear upon investor-
lender disputes absent investor deceit.
Resort to Congressional intent, then, is of little aid to the
courts in determining the effect of Title Ill and Regulation X on
actions between investors and lenders relating to margin viola-
tions. Although Title Il literally applies to domestic investors,
there is little evidence in its legislative history for requiring
margin compliance by non-deceptive investors receiving domestic
credit. Both the Senate and the House Committees were pri-
marily concerned with secret foreign credit, its use in criminal
activities, and its possible destabilizing effect on the securities
63. Sen. William Proxmire noted the application of Title M to
domestic credit in questioning Homer H. Budge, then Chairman of the
SEC:
Senator Proxmire: It has been suggested that the penalties
apply to the borrower only insofar as he borrows abroad....
IMr. Budge: I have not specifically considered that, Mr. Chair-
man, nor has the Commission. I see no reason for the distinc-
tion. ...
Senator Proxmire: Wouldn't it be easier to enforce the domes-
tic law if you could get at the borrower as well as the lender?
Mr. Budge: I am sure that it would be.
Hearings on S. 3678 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 84
(1970). Senator Proxmire later questioned Robert W. Haack, President
of the New York Stock Exchange, on the desirability of regulating
domestic credit indicating concern for deceived lenders:
Senator Proxmire: The SEC and other enforcement officials
have testified that the margain requirements can be better en-
forced if they apply both to the borrower as well as the
lender regardless of whether the borrower borrows here or
abroad. After all, the lender depends upon the certifications
made by the borrower as the purpose for the loan. Hence, if
the borrower deceives the lender in order to circumvent the
margin requirements, why shouldn't the borrower be prose-
cuted?
M. Haack: This is a very interesting provision in the bill, and
we think it is ingenious, but we think it might go too far.
Id. at 296 (emphasis added). Also note the Senate report, which stated
that
The bill would apply the margin requirements to borrowers
regardless of whether they borrow from a domestic or foreign
lender. The enforcement of the margin requirements with
respect to purely domestic credit transactions would thus be
enhanced since a borrower at times may deceive a lender by
falsely certifying the purpose of a loan thus causing the lender
to unknowingly violate the margin requirements...
S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10 (1970) (emphasis added).
64. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
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market. Thus, Title III was apparently not intended to affect
prior case law which attributed responsibility for margin viola-
tions to lenders. The only relevant purpose of Title III that can
be gleaned from its legislative history would appear to be that
Congress intended margin rules to be followed and considered
it desirable to sanction investors as well as lenders for margin
violations.
V. IMPACT OF REGULATION X
Since the literal language of Regulation X requires all in-
vestors to comply with the margin rules, two rationales used
in prior cases to permit investor recovery would seem to have
been vitiated. First, the investor's right of recovery premised
on the tort theory that he was a member of a special class pro-
tected by statute is negated by Regulation X. By requiring in-
vestor compliance with the margin rules Title III and Regula-
tion X clearly anticipated sanction rather than protection of the
investor. Second, investor protection based upon Section 29 (b) is
prevented by Regulation X. Section 29(b) provides that a con-
tract which violates a regulation is void with respect to any per-
son who is violating the regulation. 6 Prior cases construed this
section to permit the investor either to sue for damages, seek re-
scission, enforce the contract, or void the contract at the in-
vestor's option. However, investors are now subject to the mar-
gin regulations and therefore when stock agreements violate
margin rules investors violate Regulation X. Such contracts are
then void as to the investor and enforcement and recovery of
damages based on the contract are precluded. The success of an
action for restitution would not require a valid contract but
would depend on whether in pari delicto is still a viable defense.
In pari delicto, the general defense of the plaintiff's equal
fault, might, in light of Regulation X, again be advanced to
deny any type of investor relief. As discussed above, the pri-
mary rationale for permitting recovery by the investor who has
knowledge of the margin violation, was predicated upon a find-
ing that Congressional intent was to place the burden of compli-
ance with margin rules solely upon lenders.0 0 Since it is now
illegal for investors to receive credit in contravention of the
margin rules, they also have a "burden of compliance." Argu-
ably, therefore, the lender's defense of in pari delicto should no
65. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
66. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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longer be denied. However, even courts which have placed pri-
mary emphasis upon the creditor's burden of compliance in deny-
ing the defense have recognized that private investor suits sup-
plement official enforcement of the margin regulations.67
The defense of in par delicto has been disallowed expressly
on the "enforcement" rationale in other areas of the law. In
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., the Su-
preme Court denied the defense in an anti-trust action, reasoning
that private suits would further public policy and encourage com-
pliance with anti-trust laws.6s This rationale also has been ap-
plied to deny the defense with respect to violations of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.69 In Nathanson v. Weiss,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,70 where a "tippee" sued an "insider", the
defense was denied upon the theory that private suits protect
the economy from security violations. Similarly, the application
of in pari delicto to margin violations disputes should continue
to be determined as in Pearlstein in order to enhance enforce-
ment of the margin regulations. This approach would not only
be consistent with the rejection of the defense in other types of
private actions but would advance the only clear legislative pol-
icy behind Title rI-that there should be compliance with the
margin regulations.
It is not entirely clear, however, that permitting suits by
investors does indeed supplement enforcement. Arguably such
suits encourage compliance with margin requirements by deter-
ring violations on the part of lenders. On the other hand, it is
also possible that permitting investors to recover when they
have consciously violated margin requirements encourages non-
compliance on their part. Thus, it might be advantageous for
an investor to disregard margin requirements since any loss
could be recovered by a suit for damages against the creditor.
This same dilemma was present prior to the promulgation of
Regulation X, however, and those courts which employed the
67. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
68. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking
broad common-law barriers to relief when a private suit serves
important public purposes.... [T]he purposes of the anti-
trust laws are best served by insuring that the private action
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating
business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 138-39.
69. ' 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1971) (an anti-fraud provision).
70. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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"enforcement" rationale did not consider it determinative. 1
Moreover, the investor is principally deterred from violating
margin requirements by the legal sanctions to which he is now
subject. As the United States Supreme Court reasoned in Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. with regard to anti-trust law violators:
"[P]ermitting the plaintiff to recover a windfall does not en-
courage continued violations by those in his position since they
remain fully subject to civil and criminal penalties for their own
illegal conduct. '7 2
Moreover, it is important to examine the particular context
in which in pari delicto is raised. A point that has received little
attention is the fact that different margin violations involve
varying degrees of participation by the investor and lender. 8
For example, Regulation T provides a grace period during which
any unpaid margin must be deposited with the broker after
which the broker must liquidate the transaction if the investor
fails to pay the amount when due.7 4 Thus, it is the broker who
still bears the primary responsibility for compliance and who
most immediately violates Regulation T when he fails to liqui-
date the transaction at the end of the grace period. If in pari
delicto is applicable only where the plaintiff is equally at fault
with the defendant, then the defense should not bar private ac-
tions by investors under such circumstances. 75
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the promulgation of Regulation X, recovery by
knowledgeable investors in private actions against lenders who
violate margin regulations was the product of judicially created
remedies. Regulation X, however, makes the margin rules spe-
71. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
72. 392 US. at 139. See also Judge Goldbold's dissent in Kuehnert
v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969), which involved pri-
vate suits arising from violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act and echoed this aspect of the Perma Life rationale:
[L]itigation among guilty parties serves to expose their unlaw-
ful conduct and render them more easily subject to appropriate
civil, administrative and criminal penalties.
73. But see Billings Associates v. Bashaw, 27 App. Div. 2d 124, 276
N.Y.S.2d 446 (1967) (dissent of Judge Marsh).
74. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
75. Mr. Justice White, examining "equal fault," indicated that:
Generally speaking, however, I would deny recovery where
plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility
for injury resulting to one of them but permit recovery in fa-
vor of the one less responsible than the other. (emphasis added).
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts, 392 U.S. at 146 (con-
curring opinion).
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cifically applicable to investors, thus raising the question of
whether such private actions should still be permitted. Since
the legislative history of Title III of the Bank Records and For-
eign Transactions Act is unclear in this regard, courts should
remain free to continue to permit or deny such recoveries in or-
der to maximize compliance with the margin rules. This is es-
pecially true since there has been no specific Congressional or
administrative determination as to which approach would max-
imize compliance. The applicability of the defense of in pari
delicto would thus be determined as in other areas of the law
permitting private causes of action. Moreover, this approach
would be consistent with prior case law and the Congressional
purpose behind Title HI. Even though the variety of nefarious
practices in which knowledgeable investors sometimes engage
prior to seeking judicial relief may deafen the courts to investors'
pleas,76 courts should recognize that Regulation X does not man-
date overruling the prior decisions.
76. See, e.g., In the Matter of Naftalin & Co., Inc., 333 F. Supp.
136, 145 (D. Minn. 1971).
It is extremely distasteful to this court to hold that the viola-
tion of the federal regulations by members of the industry
can be used defensively by a completely and wholly unde-
serving, sophisticated and knowledgeable customer such as
Naftalin. The court concludes, however, that such a holding.
as harsh as it may seem, is consonant with the objectives and
purposes of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
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